Chapter 14: From Nonbelligerence to Neutrality, 1942-1945
"The Allied landings in northwest Africa on November 8, 1942 (Operation Torch) brought the war closer than at any previous time. German forces acted swiftly to occupy the southern half of France previously controlled by the Vichy regime, sealing the entire Pyrenean border with Spain, now caught between two fires. A few hours after the Anglo- American landings began, a personal letter from Roosevelt was hand- delivered to Franco by the new American ambassador, Carlton J. H. Hayes.' A distinguished Columbia University history professor, Hayes had been in charge of the American embassy since the beginning of the year and had formed a rather positive impression of the Caudillo.? To the relief of the Spanish government, Roosevelt assured Franco that the Allied landings in northwest Africa involved no infringement of Spains territorial sovereignty at any point, concluding with the categorical assurance “Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations,” as he titled the disarate anti-German coalition. The British government offered similar assurances, and Franco would later refer to this as his first guarantee that, if worst came to worst, his regime could survive the possible defeat of the Axis.
A new alarm was sounded at the cabinet meeting held on November 16, which was presented a report from the embassy in Berlin indicating that Hitler soon intended to request permission for the passage of troops across Spanish territory.? The Germanophile minority (Asensio, Arrese, Girón) apparently urged closer alignment with the Third Reich, but the majority supported the position of Franco and Jordana in favor of continued nonbelligerence.* The cabinet agreed that the entry of German troops had to be resisted, and on November 18 the Generalissimo ordered a partial mobilization® that for several months more than doubled the number of troops under arms. The gesture was not ineffective, reinforcing the impression in Hitlers mind that movement into the peninsula would not be worth the effort and would encounter stout resistance from the Spanish, who he had once said were the only Latins who would fight.* Before the end of the month Spanish ambassadors around the world were informed of the governments firm decision to resist any foreign occupation of the Balearics—a move reportedly under consideration by both the Allies and the Axis. At the same time that measures were taken to safeguard Spains territorial integrity, every effort was made to avoid incidents with the Anglo-American forces in Morocco and to maintain German good will by expediting the shipment of strategic raw materials and doing nothing to curb Nazi influence in the Spanish press."
"During the final weeks of 1942 Franco made it clear that the Anglo- American offensive in the west Mediterranean had not changed his political orientation, engaging in what would be the last general round of publicly fascistic remarks. On the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, he declared to the National Council of the FET: “We are witnessing the end of one era and the beginning of another. The liberal world is going under, victim of the cancer of its errors, and with it is collapsing commercial imperialism and finance capitalism with its millions of unemployed. . . .” After praising Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, he insisted, “The historical destiny of our era will be realized either by the barbarous formula of Bolshevist totalitarianism or by the patriotic and spiritual one offered by Spain or by any other formula of the fascist peoples."
"In late December Raeder, the German naval chief of staff, insisted in Berlin that Germany must guarantee for itself the full security of the Iberian peninsula in order to achieve victory in the submarine war, and Munoz Grandes and Asensio continued to speak encouraging words to German contacts, saying they were doing everything possible to convince Franco to alter his policy and enter the war.' It is doubtful that by the beginning of 1943 the Spanish military hierarchy harbored any eagerness for that prospect, however. The opinion of most commanders was quite the opposite, and as the full dimensions of Stalingrad started to unfold, the image of a German defeat began to form in the minds of some.
Gómez Jordana slowly but resolutely steered Spanish diplomacy toward a more detached and neutral course,"
"Franco was increasingly willing to be convinced, however, and a change of attitude was further encouraged by his subsecretary, Carrero Blanco, a neutralist whose personal influence with Franco on this and other issues was growing steadily. Carrero was apparently the author of an interesting memo written shortly before the end of 1942 which declared that Germany might eventually suffer “a defeat like that of 1918.” Though he characteristically blamed the war in part on “the fundamental Jewish design of annihilating Europe,” he observed that rather than face final defeat Germany would probably “make an agreement with Russia, with whom she has no fundamental religious or spiritual differences, '° a position that indicated that he had no illusions about the final tendencies of Hitlerian philosophy.
One product of this altered perspective was a Spanish diplomatic campaign in January— February 1943 which attempted to form an understanding among the remaining neutrals (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) to help mediate a negotiated peace between the Allies and Germany that would save Europe from Bolshevism. Spanish policy also envisioned closer rapport among the remaining Catholic states in association with the Vatican as a new alternate polarity of European diplomacy. Franco made a public appeal for peace in speeches delivered in Andalusia early in May, but Sweden and Switzerland refused to cooperate, while both Britain and Germany completely rejected such a prospect. Only Italy, with the possible assistance of the Vatican, might have been interested."
Henceforth Franco would expound his theory of the “three wars” underway and of Spains distinct attitude toward each: neutral in the conflict between the Allies and Germany, favoring Germany in its struggle with the Soviet Union, and favoring the Allies in the Far Eastern struggle against Japan. Franco was obviously veering towards genuine neutrality. The neo-Falangist commerce minister, Demetrio Carceller, earlier pro- German, had for some months been discreetly trying to realign Spanish commercial and economic interests in accord with those of Britain and the United States. In general, food supplies and economic conditions improved, and by the beginning of 1943 the period of the most intense suffering for much of the Spanish population was ending.
German pressure meanwhile increased once again, and on January 7, the day after Franco launched his mediation proposal, a new Spanish araments commission left for Berlin with a shopping list of military items theoretically necessary for entrance into the war. Soon afterward, Arrese and a major Falangist retinue also departed for the German capital, where the Falangist secretary had an agreeable but nonetheless distant conversation with Hitler on the nineteenth. Arrese showed no interest in talking real policy as distinct from rhetorical anticommunism, while Hitler was annoyed that Francos accompanying letter did not respond to his request for a clear commitment to resist the Allies militarily should they move into Spain.'* The new ambassador in Madrid, von Moltke, insisted that at the very least the Spanish government sign a secret protocol pledging to resist forcibly any Allied incursion. Franco agreed to do so on February 12 provided that Germany guarantee new materiel, and Hitler indicated willingness to receive yet another Spanish commission, provided that it was top-level, to arrange such assistance. For this assignment Franco chose Carlos Martinez de Campos, one of his best-trained generals and a monarchist at odds with the pro-German elements. As it turned out, Hitler provided very little in the way of military assistance but managed to put on such a convincing display of German arms that the originally skeptical Martinez de Campos returned to tell Franco that Germany would yet win the war.’"
Political Redefinitions
"The standard though ambiguous use of the term totalitarian in the regime” also began to undergo redefinition. This was initiated at the start of 1942, when Alfonso García Valdecasas, briefly cofounder of the Falange in 1933 and then the first director of the regime's Instituto de Estudios Políticos, published an article “Los Estados Totalitarios y el Estado español.” He defined it in this way:
In the original [Twenty-seven] Points of the Falange, the state is defined as a “totalitarian instrument at the service of the integrity of the Patria.” It is, then, deliberately expressed that ours is an instrumental concept of the state. Every instrument is characterized as a medium for something, by a task which it serves. No instrument is justified in and of itself. It is worth while insofar as it fulfills the end for which it is destined. Therefore, the state is not for us an end in itself, nor can it find its justification in itself.
. . . The state ought not to pursue ends nor undertake tasks that are not justified as a function of the integrity of the Patria. On the contrary, its forces are dispersed and wasted in improper enterprises, which, when attempted, aggravate the process of bureaucratization to which we have previously referred.
. . . In order to justify itself in a positive sense, the state must act as an instrument for the achievement of ultimate moral values. . . .
. . . Genuine Spanish thought refuses to recognize the state as the supreme value. This is the meaning of the polemical attitude of all classical Spanish thought against the razón de Estado enunciated by Machiavelli.”
At the Nazi-organized First Congress of European Youth, held at Vienna in 1942, parallel concepts were vigorously defended by the sizable Spanish delegation headed by the Falangists José Antonio de Elola and Pilar Primo de Rivera. It was careful to avoid identification with typically Nazi racist and paganizing statements, and insisted on amendments to the proceedings that recognized traditional Catholic morality, the importance of the family, and the secondary role of the state in education. Elola emphasized José Antonios insistence that Spain had always exercised “the leadership of universal enterprises of the spirit.” Amid considerable tension, the Spanish delegation managed to gain establishment of a special congress commission on youth and the family, whose members were subsequently invited to Spain for the festival of the Immaculate Conception, converted by the Frente de Juventudes into the Dia de la Madre, the new Spanish Mothers Day.”"
"As 1943 developed, Franco and the Falangist leadership under Arrese took steps to distinguish between Spanish Catholic authoritarianism and the central European regimes. In a major speech at Burgos on September 8, 1943, Arrese stressed that the Falange was an indigenous movement, not a foreign imitation or import. The ultimate goal of the FET and of the entire Franco movement was held to be not the construction of a totalitarian system but the integration of mankind into a universal community free of Bolshevism.* On September 23, instructions were issued forbidding anyone thenceforward to refer to the FET as a party; it was to be exclusively termed a movement, and on November 27, the FET’s Delegación Nacional de Prensa dispatched categorical instructions to the party’s press:
The following must be kept in mind as a general norm: in no case and under no pretext shall foreign texts, doctrines, or examples be used to refer to the characteristics and political principles of our movement, whether in collaborative articles or editorial commentaries on other newspapers. The Spanish state is exclusively based on national political norms, principles, and philosophy. In no case will the comparison of our state with others that might appear similar be tolerated, and particularly the drawing of consequences from supposed foreign ideological adaptations for our Patria. The basis of our state must always be identified in the original text of its founders and in the doctrine established by the Caudillo.”"
"The chief institutional innovation accompanying this phase of redefinition was a new corporative parliament, called after Spanish custom the Cortes. Before 1943 the nominal structure of the Franco regime was the most purely arbitrary in the world. Stalin and Hitler went through the act of maintaining fictive and impotent parliaments, but not even that existed in Spain. On July 17, 1942, a government law first announced plans to institute a corporative Cortes, a sort of reincarnation of Primo de Riveras Asamblea Nacional on a permanent basis. In this, as in all other institutional changes, the regime made haste slowly. Arrese had drawn up the original project, which was further polished by Serrano Súñer. The function of the Cortes would be more technical than political. It would provide a covering of legitimization and support to the regime, but it would have the right to pass on legislation introduced by the government.
The convening of the Cortes was not announced until February 7, 1943, in the immediate aftermath of Stalingrad. Of the 424 seats in the first cortes, 126 were allocated to members of the National Council of the FET and other Falangist appointees, 141 to officials of the syndical system (also nominally Falangist), and 102 to mayors of the leading cities. Ex officio members included all cabinet ministers, the heads of leading state institutions such as the Supreme Court, and rectors of all Spanish universities (themselves government appointees under the Spanish system). Finally, 7 representatives were to be chosen by professional organizations, and 50 were designated personally by the Caudillo. In the first Cortes those chosen for the latter category were primarily conservative mon- archists, to balance off the heavy FET and syndical representation.* Francos undersecretary Carrero and a moderate Falangist were made vice- presidents of the new Cortes under the presidency of the Carlist Esteban Bilbao. Virtually all members were state appointees™; a more docile assembly could scarcely have been conceived.
Francos speech at the initial session of March 17, 1943, hailed it as the beginning of an “institutional system of full juridical development.” Comparing it with the old liberal parliaments, Franco declared, “We are installing an enlightened and paternal system of government [entirely free of] the foreignizing and Jeremiac labors of the liberals. . . . We seek liberty, but with order.” He urged the procuradores (as members were called, restoring the terminology of the preliberal Antiguo Régimen) to “collaborate” with the government, which he said “does not presume to be infallible in its proposals,” indicating that “disagreement” would also be welcomed,* a verbal show of objectivity that led astray none of the controlled membership. The first Cortes would show itself totally subservient to the government in every way."
The Monarchist Offensive of 1943
"The change in the balance of the war, together with the first sign of reform in the regime, provided direct encouragement to monarchists to work toward an immediate restoration, arguably the logical replacement for Franco in terms acceptable to Allied opinion. This tactic did not emerge until 1942, for the royal family had strongly supported the Nationalist cause both financially and politically during its early years.* The heir to the throne, Don Juan, had twice presented himself as a military volunteer, first for the Nationalist Army in the rebel zone during the initial weeks of the conflict and then, in writing several months later, for service aboard the new Nationalist cruiser Baleares (which would have taken advantage of his early training with the British Navy). The Nationalist command had refused his services on both occasions, to avoid compromising their own cause by such an association with the relatively unpopular monarchy and to avoid risking the life of the heir to the throne (the Baleares, in fact, was sunk in 1938). During the first part of the European war Don Juan had been friendly to the Axis (Alfonso XIII residing in Rome until his death in 1941), and various intermediaries had sounded out German support for a monarchist restoration in Spain oriented toward the New Order.”
The conversion of Don Juan to the cause of constitutional monarchy and western democracy was thus a product of changing circumstances, encouraged further by the geopolitical leanings of the queen mother, Victoria Eugenia, English in origin and a strong supporter of the Allied cause. During 1942 his advisers and supporters swung heavily toward the Allies, and one group even made plans with the British to establish a monarchist resistance government in the Canaries should Hitler invade the peninsula. From his residence in Lausanne he began to mark a new line immediately after the Allied landing in northwest Africa, declaring that the future government of Spain “depended on the will of the Spanish people.” = On March 8, 1943, Don Juan wrote to Franco for the first time in nearly a year, declaring that the continuation of Francos “provisional regime’ was exposing Spain to grave risks and urging him to move quickly toward restoration.* Monarchist supporters stepped up their activity, creating excitement over a possibly imminent change of institutions."
"Carrero Blanco, who had now replaced Serrano as his chief advisor, had prepared a memorandum for him soon after the last change of government, recommending categorically, “It is evident that the future of Spain . . . lies in a monarchy of the traditional [i.e., not constitutional] type."
"Franco thus waited two and a half months before replying to Don Juan on May 27 that his government was not simply transitory but represented an organized movement that was already in place and must obey its own rhythms, which only Franco was in a position to interpret. He revealed that he did consider the Pretender his potential successor, but only so long as the monarchy accepted the “standards of the Movement,” which was not a political party but the basis of national unity “founded on eternal and incontrovertible principles.”
"Franco received the most direct challenge from inside the regime that he had yet faced, when twenty-seven monarchist procuradores of the new Cortes directly petitioned him to complete the “definition and ordering of the fundamental institutions of the state” by restoring the monarchy, which would be the best safeguard for the neutrality and integrity of Spain.* Among the signatories were sometime leading Falangists such as Garcia Valdecasas and Gamero del Castillo, as well as one lieutenant general. Franco as usual failed to make any formal response, though on June 26 six of the signatories who also happened to be members of the National Council of the FET (such as Gamero and Valdecasas) lost their seats on the council. The only other formal reprisal was the exile to La Palma in the Canaries of a monarchist aristocrat whom Franco held most responsible for the petition, the Conde de los Andes. Meanwhile, to divide the monarchists and confuse the issue, the FET leadership subsidized a diversionary campaign on behalf of a secondary Carlist pretender descended through the female line from Don Carlos “VII.”*"
"The Italian Fascist regime, since 1936 the chief foreign model for the new Spanish government, suddenly be- came the primary foreign model to avoid. Mussolinis successors hoped to use Spains good offices and diplomatic channels to expedite negotiations with the Allies, but Franco and Jordana largely refused assistance, fearing to have Spain in any way involved in the Italian Fascist debacle. Mussolinis subsequent Saló Republic, organized as a German puppet in occupied northern Italy, was denied official recognition. Franco dispatched only a semiofficial personal representative, similar in status to the Spanish representative attached to De Gaulle Free French government in London, and major Italian figures who sought Spanish passports and the op- portunity to flee to Spain were almost always denied assistance."
"The only institution capable of forcing a change in government at this point was the one which had raised Franco to supreme power in the first place—the military. The political dissatisfaction of many senior commanders, so often near the surface the past three years, finally took concrete form in a letter signed by seven of the twelve lieutenant generals on September 8 and delivered to Franco three days later by the army minister, Asensio. It read:
Excellency,
The high commanders of the Army are aware that it is the only organic reserve on which Spain can rely to subdue the grave crises that destiny may allot her in the near future. These authorities, wishing to give no excuse to enemies domestic or foreign by allowing them to think the Army’s unity weakened or its discipline diminished, made certain that no subordinate ranks took part in the exchange of views to which patriotism obliged them. For that same reason, they employed the most discreet and respectful means to make known their concern to their only senior commander in the Army, doing so with affectionate sincerity, in their own names, and without claiming the representation of the entire armed forces, which was neither requested nor granted.
They are companions in arms who come to share their worry and concern with him who has achieved by his toil and his own merit the highest rank in the Armies of Land, Sea, and Air, won in a difficult and victorious war; the same who . . . placed in your hands seven years ago in the Salamanca airdrome the supreme powers of military command and of the state.
On that occasion, the correctness of our decision was crowned with glory by complete and magnificent victory, and the exclusive act of will of certain generals was transformed into national agreement by the unanimous assent, tacit or enthusiastic, of the people, to such a degree that prolongation of the mandate beyond the term foreseen was legitimate.
We hope that the discretion which then accompanied us has not abandoned us today as we ask our Generalissimo, with all loyalty, respect, and affection, if he does not think, as do we, that the moment has arrived to give Spain back a regime as fondly remembered by himself as by us; one that can uphold the state with the bulwarks of unity, tradition, and prestige inherent in the monarchical formula. The hour seems propitious to delay no longer the restoration of this authentically Spanish form of government, which created the grandeur of Spain and from which she departed to imitate foreign models. The Army will unanimously support Your Excellency's decision and stand ready to repress any attempt at internal disturbance and opposition, either open or covert, without the slightest fear of the Communist menace . . . or of foreign interference.
This, Your Excellency, is the request that your old comrades in arms and respectful subordinates address with the strictest discipline and most sincere loyalty to the Generalissimo of the Spanish armed forces and Chief of State.
Though relatively obsequious in tone—a much harsher draft having been rejected by most of the signatories*—+this was the only time in the thirty-nine years of the regime that a majority of Francos senior generals asked him to resign. "
"At least two supporters of the letter changed their minds. Saliquet, the captain-general of Madrid, announced after talking later with Franco that he had made a mistake. As the weeks passed, Asensio also began to waver, particularly after an incident at the opening of the fall course at the Superior War College (Escuela Superior de Guerra) where Franco's appearance prompted prolonged ovations from a group of eighty junior officers and fifty sergeants.”
During late September and October the Generalissimo talked to a number of senior commanders, explaining patiently that though an appropriate restoration of the monarchy was the ultimate goal, the present situation was too dangerous both internationally and domestically to risk any immediate changes. Moreover, he told them that it was by no means certain that Germany would lose the war (for he had been informed of German ‘secret weapons), and that in any event the Allies had assured him that they would not move against the Spanish government.* "
"The final round in this opening phase of what would become a decades- long drama between Franco and the Pretender took place during the winter of 1944. Spanish intelligence intercepted a letter from Don Juan to his supporters indicating that he might be on the verge of a public announcement breaking all ties with the regime. Therefore, on January 6, 1944—the same day that Asensio, the army minister, organized a public ceremony of personal loyalty to Franco by the Army—Franco wrote once more to the Pretender reiterating his own position. Don Juan replied on the twenty-fifth insisting that Franco misunderstood the situation.” This produced a virtual breakdown in personal relations, though it did not take public form."
"Francos tactics relied on his perfect calm and air of absolute self- assurance, his refusal to react, become excited, or make the slightest real concession on the one hand while convincing nominal monarchists and their hangers-on of his indispensability on the other. The monarchists above all represented the social and economic elite; none more than they feared a leap in the dark. The danger that any serious attempt to remove Franco might open the door to subversion of the Nationalist state, internal disorder, or further fratricide was sufficient to dissuade nearly all in time of test."
Politics and Diplomacy in The Final Phase of World War I
"Whatever Francos personal opinion, the Supreme General Staff (AEM) completed a study of the European military situation on May 19, 1943, which concluded that German defeat would be the most likely outcome, leaving the Soviet Union dominant in Europe.” "
"Allied pressure mounted in mid-1943 as the strategic situation shifted. Washington, particularly, began to take a stronger line against Madrid and planned to reduce drastically the oil exports vital to Spains economy, though Ambassador Hayes managed to counter this by a strong stand in favor of maintaining the volume of oil shipment.” Jordana in turn responded to the course of events by insisting on June 1 that the government must take steps to control the pro-German propaganda which dominated the Spanish press.* Similarly he made a protest to the American ambassador over the release of the new American propaganda news- reel “Inside Fascist Spain,” rejecting the application of this adjective to the Spanish regime. Having already established sound credentials regarding his own good faith and friendship toward Spain, Hayes replied in a long letter which listed in detail all the features of the government similar to those of Italy and Germany, as well as its special policies favoring the latter. Subsequently, following a frank discussion between Hayes and Franco on July 29, the tone of the Spanish press toward the Allies began to change.”"
"With both western allies taking a strong line toward Madrid, in Novem- ber the American government asked for a complete embargo on Spanish shipment of wolfram to Germany, which Franco refused. The Blue Divi- sion, however, was officially disbanded that month, ending Francos major collaboration with Nazi Germany. Altogether, 47,000 Spanish officers and men had served on the eastern front, suffering about 22,000 casualties (47 percent), of whom approximately 4,500 died.* They had fought well, and may have helped Franco buy time from Hitler. Some volunteered to remain, but Franco limited these to three battalions (2,133 officers and men), so that this residual Blue Legion (as it was informally known) would be relatively inconspicuous. It in turn was dissolved on March 15, 1944, and the remaining troops incorporated into the Waffen SS (together with scores of new volunteers directly from Spain). Curiously, the remnants of the Spanish battalion of the Waffen SS helped to defend a part of Berlin (including the Fuehrerbunker perimeter) during Hitler's final days at the
close of April 1945.*"
"Franco would subsequently claim that the most difficult time of all came in January 1944, when the regime feared that the Allies might open their second front against Germany in Spain before entering France,® while all danger from Germany still had not ended.” On February 7 he changed the priorities in Spains defense plan, to guard against an Allied coastal invasion rather than a trans-Pyrenean German onslaught.” Early in 1944 Allied economic policy toward Spain became much harsher, with an announced total suspension of oil shipments until the export of strategic raw materials to Germany was ended. Franco at first was prepared to withstand this pressure, despite the suffering which it would cause the Spanish economy, and was strongly backed by the chief Falangist ministers, Arrese and Primo de Rivera, together with General Asensio, who had swung back to a more pro-German line once more. Though Jordana protested to Hayes (correctly) that this violated the Allies’ solemn promise that Spain had “nothing to fear’ from them, he insisted to Franco that their countrys economic survival depended on coming to terms with the Allies, and after further threats to resign finally carried his point.” Two years of diplomatic and commercial tension with the western democracies over wolfram exports and other shipments to Germany were finally ended by an agreement completed on May 1, 1944. It stipulated that Spain would reserve nearly all its wolfram for the Allies, close the German consulate in Spanish-occupied Tangier, and expel German information agents in return for adequate shipments of petroleum and other necessities.”
"Probably the most truly neutral aspect of Spanish policy had been the regimes treatment of refugees, especially Jews. Altogether, during the first part of the war some 30,000 Jews had received safe passage through Spain, and there is no indication of any Jew who reached Spanish soil being turned back to German authorities. Approximately 7,500 more may have passed through between 1942 and 1944, and during the later phases of the SS roundup in Hungary and the Balkans Spanish consular officials managed to provide protection (through citizenship status) to more than 3,200 additional Jews, many of the latter Sephardic.”"
"Despite the May 1944 agreement with the Allies, Spain continued to provide certain kinds of intelligence facilities to the Germans, and made possible the first transfer of the new wonder drug penicillin from the west to Germany in October 1944.” This has led more than one commentator to conclude that Franco continued to try to hedge his bets as long as possible. That is probably correct, but the minor assistance that continued to be lent to Germany throughout 1944 and the favorable commentary in the Spanish press even into 1945 may as accurately be seen simply as the continuing expression of the undeniable pro-German sympathies felt by so much of Spanish government, military, and press personnel
The success of the Allied invasion of France and the subsequent break- through finally convinced Franco that German defeat was indeed inevitable and not likely to be avoided by last minute wonder weapons. The Allies were then granted overflight rights in Spanish air space for antisub- marine patrols and were also allowed to evacuate casualties from France through Barcelona. In one sense there is no doubt that the regime had become sincere in seeking closer cooperation with the Allies, for, as Franco explained to the American ambassador on July 6, he looked to them to defend Europe from Communism after the defeat of Germany.”"
"On August 21, 1944, direct instructions were finally given the Spanish press to observe genuine neutrality in commenting on international and military developments, with the express exception of those referring to the Soviet Union. The press was ordered to favor the United States in its treatment of the Pacific war and to be more positive in transmitting news of Allied advances in the west than in reporting Soviet advances in the east. Soviet actions on behalf of the Allied war effort were to be referred to as Russian rather than Soviet, while Communist political activities would still be condemned.* Barcelona was converted into a free port for transshipment of Allied materiel, and eventually in February 1945 Ameri- can transport planes were given regular use of Spanish facilities.
Heartened by Churchill's speech the previous May, Franco wrote a personal and rather smug letter to the British prime minister on October 18, 1944, about the importance of closer friendship between Britain and Spain to save western Europe from Communism.* In this he considerably overreached himself; Churchill did not reply for three months, and then only to rebuke him in discouraging terms, while a subsequent personal letter from Roosevelt was even harsher in tone. To Franco, this further demonstrated the degree of domination by Masonry in both London and Washington. The British ambassador meanwhile stressed to Lequerica that the absence of democracy in Spain constituted an almost insuperable barrier to better relations, to which the latter replied with unassailable logic that this surely could not be the case in view of the Allies' good relations with Stalin.*"
"At approximately the same time, the question of future policy toward Spain was being extensively discussed in London. Churchill argued force- fully against any plan to intervene overtly in Spanish affairs, observing that the Spanish regime had “done us much more good than harm in the war.” He went on to declare:
I am no more in agreement with the internal government of Russia than I am with that of Spain, but I would certainly rather live in Spain than Russia.
_.. You need not, I think, suppose that Franco's position will be weakened by our warnings. He and all those with him will never consent to be butchered by the Republicans, which is what would happen. . . .
. . . Already we are accused in many responsible quarters of handing over the Balkans and Central Europe to the Russians, and if we now lay hands on Spain, I am of opinion that we shall be making needless trouble for ourselves. . .
. . Should the Communists become masters of Spain we must expect the in- fection to spread very fast through both Italy and France. . .
. . I should of course be very glad to see a Monarchical and Democratic restoration, but once we have identified ourselves with the Communist side in Spain which, whatever you say, would be the effect of your policy, all our influ- ence will be gone for a middle course.”"
"the new Truman administration in Washington seemed if anything more antagonistic than Roosevelt's, and the Allies’ Potsdam Conference of July 1945 realized the regime's fears. Against the wishes of Churchill, it formally recommended to the new United Nations then being organized that relations with the Spanish government be broken and support be transferred to “democratic forces” in order that Spain might have a regime of its own choice.*"
Spanish Policy in World War II: Summary and Evaluation
"In fact, between July and October 1940 and to some extent at several points afterwards, Franco was perfectly ready to enter the conflict on Hitlers side as soon as Hitler fully met his price. In this, as in certain other aspects of foreign policy, Franco was sometimes neither hábil nor prudente. The decision not to bring Spain in was initially made by Hitler rather than Franco, for Hitler never judged the value of Spanish participation worth the potential cost of alienating Vichy France through the loss of a large part of its African territory. Needless to say, neither Hitler nor Mussolini viewed Franco as an equal; they considered him an “accidental” military dictator of a weak country who lacked the status or credentials of a major statesman. Spain was relegated to the southern, “Italian” sphere, and the Mussolini government, though sometimes generous to Spain, looked upon the Franco regime alternately as a sort of younger brother and as a semisatellite. It was reluctant to recruit Spanish entry too seriously for fear of raising up another rival in North Africa.
Though the right terms might have brought Spain into the war as late as the spring of 1942, Franco became increasingly committed to a policy of attentisme after October 1940. He was indeed more prudent and calculat- ing than Mussolini, in part because Spain was distinctly weaker than Italy. He grasped that a militarily insignificant Spain could gain maximal terms from Hitler only before, not after, its entry into the war, and therefore he stubbornly held out for his price, a policy usually encouraged by Serrano Súñer. Moreover, there was much internal disagreement about the war within the regime. Falangist enthusiasm for the Axis was tempered by the increasing opposition of much of the military, who together with much of Catholic and Carlist opinion tended more toward neutrality and sometimes even a pro-Allied posture. Monarchists, including the Pretender, to some extent played both sides, but made a definitive switch to a pro-Allied strategy late in 1942."
"Even more ironic, despite Francos uncertain prospects after Allied victory, is the likelihood that his future would have been more bleak had Hitler actually won. The Generalissimo's persistent tacking, delays, and dissimulation had eventually so infuriated Hitler that, according to Albert Speer, he swore to get even with Franco by using his domestic enemies to overthrow him.”
At the same time, it must be recognized that the war years were crucial for the internal consolidation of Francos government. The immediate post— Civil War period, coinciding with the tensions of World War II, was the time of greatest dissidence within the Nationalist elites. These years revealed grave deficiencies in the new bureaucratic and administrative structure, along with a sharp divergence of criteria among the principal political families of the regime. Franco encountered greater discontent and political resistance among the military during World War II than at any subsequent period in the history of the regime. His successive governmental reorganizations between 1939 and 1945 were therefore crucial in solidifying his own leadership over the military in particular and the entire regime in general. In the process, his self-confidence and belief in a providential mission steadily increased. The experience thus gained, together with the accompanying solidification of his regime, enabled him tface with confidence and determination the external opposition and isolation that followed the end of World War I"